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However a firm with more products attracts more consumers with low valuations,
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Most retailers sell multiple products and consumers frequently purchase several
items in one shopping trip. Consumers often know a lot about a retailer’s products,
but they are poorly-informed about the prices of individual items unless they buy
them on a regular basis. Therefore a consumer must spend time searching a retailer
in order to learn its prices. The literature has mainly focused on single-product
search, but many issues are more naturally analyzed in a multiproduct framework.
For example it is well-documented that larger retailers with broader product ranges
charge lower prices, so we would expect consumers to take this into account when
searching. Some firms also use advertising to inform consumers about a small
proportion of their prices. The remaining (unadvertised) prices are typically much
higher, and can only be learnt by visiting the retailer. Restaurants for example
advertise cheap deals on main courses but sell over-priced drinks and desserts. We
would again expect advertised prices to influence a consumer’s search behavior.
The aim of this paper is to build a simple model of multiproduct search, and use
it to explore questions such as the following. Why do larger retailers often charge
lower prices? Why might a retailer sell selected items at below-cost prices? When
a retailer offers a good deal on one product, does it simply compensate by raising
the prices of other goods?
To answer these questions we focus on the pricing behavior of a monopolist
who sells a number of independent products. Consumers have different valuations
for different products, and would like to buy one unit of each. Every consumer
is privately informed about how much she values the products, but does not know
their prices. The retailer can inform consumers about one of its prices by paying
a cost and sending out adverts. Consumers observe whether or not an advert was
sent, and form (rational) expectations about the price of every product within the
store. Each consumer then decides whether or not to pay a search cost and visit
the retailer. After searching, a consumer learns actual prices and makes purchases.
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We think this set-up closely approximates several product markets. For instance
local convenience shops and drugstores sell mainly standardized products which do
not change much over time. A consumer’s main reason for visiting them is not to
learn whether their products are a good ‘match’, but instead to buy products that
she already knows are suitable. On the other hand prices are hard to remember and
may change over time, so consumers are not well-informed about them before they
go shopping.
Our paper is closely related to Diamond (1971), which has become known as
the ‘Diamond Paradox’. Suppose that consumers have unit demands, that firms
sell only one product and do not advertise its price, and that each search incurs a
cost s > 0. Then the Paradox states that the market completely collapses (Stiglitz
1979). The reason is that if consumers expect retailers to charge a price pe, only
people with a valuation above pe + s will search. After paying the search cost, all
these consumers will buy the product provided its actual price is below pe+s. Hence
there cannot be an equilibrium in which some consumers search, because retailers
would always charge more than was expected. Instead in equilibrium pe must be so
high that nobody searches, no trade occurs, and the market collapses.
Many papers have suggested possible ways to overcome this ‘no trade’ Paradox.
Firstly some consumers might enjoy shopping and have no search cost (Stahl 1989).
Secondly firms might send out adverts which commit them to charging a particular
price, and thereby guarantee consumers some surplus (Wernerfelt 1994, Anderson
and Renault 2006). Thirdly consumers might only learn their match for a product
after searching for it. Anderson and Renault (1999) show that the market does not
collapse provided there is enough preference for variety.
We show that multiproduct retailers can also overcome Diamond’s ‘no trade’
Paradox. Intuitively in the single-product case, only consumers with a high valua-
tion decide to search, so retailers exploit this and charge a high price. However in
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the multiproduct case, somebody with a low valuation on one product may search
because she has a high valuation on another. When the firm increases one of its
prices, some consumers with a low valuation for that product stop buying it. This
reduces the retailer’s incentive to surprise consumers by charging more than they
expected. Consequently there can exist equilibria in which consumers search, even
when all prices are unadvertised and everybody has a positive search cost.
Nevertheless the logic behind the Diamond Paradox can provide new insights
into how multiproduct firms set their prices. Consumers still only search if they have
relatively high valuations, so unadvertised prices are also relatively high. However
we show that a larger retailer (who sells more products) is searched by a broader
‘mix’ of consumers, who on average have lower valuations for any individual prod-
uct. A larger retailer therefore charges lower prices - consumers anticipate this and
incorporate it into their search decision. We also show that despite charging lower
prices, larger retailers earn higher profit on each product.1
Whilst there is a large literature on advertising (see Bagwell 2007 for a survey)
there is relatively little work on the relationship between advertised and unadver-
tised prices. This paper tries to fill that gap by allowing the firm to send out an
advert which directly informs consumers about one of its prices. We show that
when the firm cuts its advertised price, some new consumers with relatively low
valuations decide to search. The firm then finds it optimal to also reduce its un-
advertised prices, in order to sell more products to these new searchers. Therefore
1Two related papers are Villas-Boas (2009) and Zhou (2010), in which consumers search for
both price and product match information. In Villas-Boas’ model a monopolist sells many substitute
products. It charges higher prices when it sells more products, because it provides consumers with
a better product match. In Zhou’s model firms sell two independent products, and a consumer’s
match realizations are independent across retailers. Prices are typically lower than in the single-
product version of the model, because a price reduction on one product causes more consumers to
stop searching and buy both products immediately.
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consumers (rationally) expect a positive relationship between the firm’s advertised
and unadvertised prices. Whilst the firm cannot commit in advance to its unadver-
tised prices, it can indirectly convey information about them via its advertised price.
One implication is that a low advertised price on one product can build a store-wide
‘low price-image’, even on completely unrelated products.
Our result on multiproduct advertising is related to but different from Lal and
Matutes (1994) and Ellison (2005), in which two firms are located on a Hotelling
line and sell two products but advertise only one of them. In Lal and Matutes all
consumers have an identical willingness to pay H for one unit of each good. In
Ellison all consumers value the advertised (base) product the same, but have either
a high or a low valuation for the unadvertised (add-on) product.2 As in Diamond’s
model, the unadvertised price is driven up to H in Lal and Matutes, and (typically)
up to the high-types’ willingness to pay in Ellison’s model. Firms use their adver-
tised price to compete for store traffic, but unlike in our model, cannot use it to
credibly convey information about their unadvertised price. The difference arises
because in our paper valuations are heterogeneous and continuously distributed.
Therefore when a firm changes its advertised price, the pool of searchers also
changes and this alters the firm’s pricing incentives on its other products. Simester
(1995) also finds that prices are positively correlated, but due to cost rather than
preference heterogeneity. In his model a low-cost firm charges a lower unadver-
tised price, and may signal its cost advantage to consumers by advertising a lower
price on another good as well.
We also show that sometimes the firm sells its advertised product at a loss. This
can be a profitable strategy because it builds a low-price image, and this encour-
2More precisely consumers in Ellison’s model have either a high or a low marginal utility of
income (and therefore either a low or a high valuation for the add-on). This induces correlation in
horizontal and vertical attributes, and raises industry profits when add-on prices are not advertised.
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ages many more consumers to search and ultimately buy products. Bliss (1988)
and Ambrus and Weinstein (2008) also study loss-leader pricing, but in their mod-
els consumers are fully-informed about all prices. Bliss shows that firms cover their
overheads by using Ramsey pricing, and he argues that some mark-ups could be
negative. However in a related paper Ambrus and Weinstein prove that loss-leading
is only possible when there are very delicate demand complementarities between
products.3 Our model on the other hand can generate loss-leaders even when all
products are symmetric and independent. Closer in spirit are Hess and Gerstner
(1987) and Lal and Matutes (1994), both of which show that firms advertise loss-
leaders to attract consumers, before charging them very high prices on other unad-
vertised products.4 However none of these papers capture the idea that loss-leaders
are profitable because they commit a firm to charging store-wide low prices.
Finally we extend the model in two directions. Firstly we show that many of
our results generalize when consumers have downward-sloping (rather than unit)
demands. Secondly we introduce competition, by studying the case where two
firms sell the same two products but can advertise only one of them. We show that
each firm’s advertised and unadvertised prices are random and, as in the benchmark
model, are positively correlated. This contrasts with McAfee (1995) and Hosken
and Reiffen (2007) who find that multiproduct firms’ prices are negatively corre-
lated, and with Shelegia (2010) who finds that prices are uncorrelated. However
3Also related are DeGraba (2006) and Chen and Rey (2010). In DeGraba’s model some con-
sumers are more profitable than others, and firms target the more profitable consumers by offering
loss-leaders on products that are (primarily) bought by them. In Chen and Rey consumers differ in
terms of their shopping cost, such that a retailer may use a loss-leader on one product in order to
better discriminate between multi-stop and one-stop shoppers.
4Konishi and Sandfort (2002) also show that a monopolist selling substitute products, often ad-
vertises a low price on one of them to attract consumers to its store. The firm hopes that once inside
the store, some of these consumers will switch to a more expensive substitute.
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these papers are quite different from ours because all prices are unadvertised, and
instead competition is driven by the assumption that some consumers are shoppers.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 1 outlines the model, whilst
section 2 characterizes prices when the firm decides not to advertise. Section 3 then
investigates how the firm can use advertising to create a low-price image. Finally
section 4 extends some of the results whilst section 5 concludes.
1 Model
A single firm produces n goods, denoted by j = 1, 2, . . . , n, at zero marginal cost.
The n products are neither substitutes nor complements, and consumers demand at
most one unit of each. There is a unit mass of consumers, and we let (v1, v2, ..., vn)
denote a typical consumer’s valuations for the n products. Each vj is drawn inde-
pendently across both products and consumers, using a distribution function F (vj).
The corresponding density f (vj) is strictly positive, continuously differentiable,
and logconcave on the interval [a, b] (where b > 0).5 In the textbook zero-search-
cost model, each good’s profit function is strictly quasiconcave and has a unique
maximizer pm = arg max p [1− F (p)]. To simplify matters we focus on the case
pm > a, although our results also hold when pm = a.
The monopolist can pay a cost ca and advertise one of its prices. The advertise-
ment is received by all consumers and must be truthful. Consumers observe whether
or not the firm advertises (and if so, observe the advertised price) and then form ex-
pectations about all prices, denoted pe = (pe1, p
e
2, .....p
e
n). Consumers must pay a
search cost s > 0 to visit the store and learn its unadvertised prices. Once incurred,
this search cost is sunk. Prior to visiting the store, consumers know their valua-
5Bagnoli and Bergstrom (2005) show that many common densities (and their truncations) are
logconcave. Logconcavity ensures that the hazard rate f (vj)/ (1− F (vj)) is increasing.
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tions (v1, v2, ..., vn) for each of the products. Using their expectations about price,
they visit if and only if their expected surplus
∑n
j=1 max
(
vj − pej , 0
)
is greater than
the search cost. After they have arrived at the store, consumers learn actual prices
(p1, p2, .....pn) and make their purchases. All parties are risk neutral and rational.
The move order of the model is summarized as follows. In the first stage the
monopolist chooses whether or not to advertise, and if so picks its advertised price.
It then chooses (but does not disclose) the prices of the remaining goods. In the
second stage consumers observe the firm’s advertising behavior, form expectations
about prices, and decide whether or not to visit the store. In the third stage con-
sumers who decided to visit then learn actual prices, and make purchase decisions.
2 No advertising
This section analyzes the benchmark case in which the firm has decided not to
advertise any of its prices.
2.1 Solving for equilibrium prices
Consumers learn that the firm has not advertised, and then form expectations pe =
(pe1, p
e
2, . . . , p
e
n) about the price of each product. A consumer visits the store if and
only if her expected surplus
∑n
j=1 max
(
vj − pej , 0
)
exceeds the search cost s. Once
inside the store, she buys product i provided that her valuation vi exceeds the actual
price pi. Therefore demand for unadvertised product i is
Di (pi;p
e) =
b∫
pi
f (vi) Pr
(
n∑
j=1
max
(
vj − pej , 0
) ≥ s) dvi (1)
The firm chooses the actual price pi to maximize its profit piDi (pi;pe) on good
i. In equilibrium consumer price expectations must be correct, so we require that
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pei = argmax
pi
piDi (pi;p
e). Imposing this condition, we have the following lemma
(Note that all proofs in the paper appear in the appendices.)
Lemma 1 The equilibrium price of unadvertised good i satisfies
Di (pi = p
e
i ;p
e)− peif (pei ) Pr
(∑
j 6=i
max
(
vj − pej , 0
) ≥ s) = 0 (2)
To understand (2), consider a small increase in pi above the expected level pei .
The firm gains revenue on those who continue to buy, and they have mass equal
to demand. It loses pei on those who stop buying good i, and they have mass
f (pei ) Pr
(∑
j 6=i max
(
vj − pej , 0
) ≥ s). Intuitively, each consumer who stops buy-
ing the good a). has a marginal valuation vi = pei for it, and b). has searched. Any
consumer who is marginal for good i only searches if her expected surplus on the
remaining n− 1 goods,∑j 6=i max (vj − pej , 0), exceeds the search cost s.
Figure 1 illustrates search behavior when n = 2 and consumers rationally an-
ticipate prices pe1 and p
e
2. Consumers in the top-right corner have both a high v1
and a high v2, and therefore definitely search and buy both products. Consumers in
the bottom-right corner have v2 ≤ pe2 and therefore do not expect to buy product 2;
however they still search provided that v1 ≥ pe1 + s because they expect product 1
alone to give enough surplus to cover the search cost. If the firm considered increas-
ing the actual price p1 slightly above the expected level pe1, only those consumers
on the thick line would stop buying product 1. All other marginal consumers for
product 1 have v2 < pe2 + s, so they don’t search and are not affected by changes in
p1. We immediately notice the following:
Example 2 (Diamond Paradox) If n = 1 and the firm does not advertise, any
equilibrium has pe1 ∈ (b− s, b] and no trade
If the firm only sells one product, no marginal consumer pays the search cost.
Therefore equation (2) can only be satisfied if D1 (p1 = pe1; p
e
1) = 0, or equivalently9
pe1 p
e
1+sa b
pe2
pe2+s
a
b
v2
v1
Search and
buy product
1 only
Marginal consumers
for product 1 who
search
Search and buy
both products
Search and buy
product 2 only
Figure 1: Search behavior when n = 2
if the expected price is so high that nobody finds it worthwhile to search. Intuitively
consumers face the following hold-up problem: anticipating a price pe1, everybody
who visits the store is prepared to pay at least pe1 + s, so the firm exploits this and
charges more than expected. The hold-up problem is only resolved when pe1 ∈
(b− s, b] - nobody pays the search cost so the firm is happy to set p1 = pe1.
Proposition 3 now shows that an equilibrium with trade does exist, provided the
firm sells enough products. Note that each unadvertised good has a first order condi-
tion of the form (2). A vector of unadvertised prices constitutes an equilibrium if a).
the prices solve each first order condition and b). the firm’s profit is quasiconcave
in each unadvertised price.6
6It is not always straightforward to prove quasiconcavity in consumer search models. However
sufficient conditions for piDi (pi;pe) to be quasiconcave in pi are i). the standard monopoly profit
function p [1− F (p)] is concave or ii). Pr
(∑
j 6=i max
(
vj − pej , 0
) ≥ s) > 1/ 2. The former
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Proposition 3 If n is sufficiently large, there exists at least one (‘non-Diamond’)
equilibrium in which trade occurs
Proposition 3 shows that multiproduct retailers can overcome the Diamond
Paradox. Of course there are always equilibria in which no consumer visits the
store, and no trade occurs.7 This is also the only equilibrium outcome if n = 1 as
illustrated in example 2. However if n is sufficiently large, there also exist ‘non-
Diamond’ equilibria in which trade occurs. Intuitively many consumers who are
marginal for a particular product, will search when n is large because there are other
products which offer them positive surplus. If the firm tried to ‘hold up’ consumers
and charge more than was expected, it would then lose a lot of demand from these
marginal consumers. This deters the firm from holding people up, and so equilibria
with trade can exist. We also argue in section 2.2 below that Diamond’s no-trade
outcome is unlikely to occur when these non-Diamond equilibria exist.
Although proposition 3 shows that a multiproduct firm can overcome the Di-
amond Paradox, the logic behind the Paradox can still provide insights into how
unadvertised prices are determined. In order to show this, it is convenient to intro-
duce the notation tj ≡ max
(
vj − pej , 0
)
for the expected surplus on good j. The
equilibrium price of unadvertised product i is affected by the behavior of three dif-
ferent groups. Consumers with
∑n
j=1 tj < s do not visit the store, and therefore
do not respond to changes in pi. Consumers with
∑n
j=1 tj ≥ s do visit the store,
and subdivide into two groups. We use the term ‘shoppers for product i’ to denote
those with
∑
j 6=i tj ≥ s. These consumers search irrespective of how much they
holds if the density f (vi) does not decrease too rapidly, and the latter if n is large enough. See
lemma 19 in appendix A for further details.
7When
∑n
j=1
(
b− pej
) ≤ s expected prices are so high that no consumer searches. The firm is
then indifferent about what prices to charge, and so is happy to set pj = pej for each product j.
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value product i.8 We use the term ‘Diamond consumers for product i’ to denote
those people with
∑n
j=1 tj ≥ s >
∑
j 6=i tj . These consumers only search because
they anticipate a strictly positive surplus on product i.
Lemma 4 The pricing condition (2) can be rewritten as
Pr
(∑
j 6=i
tj ≥ s
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Probability of a shopper
[1− F (pei )− peif (pei )] +Pr
(
n∑
j=1
tj ≥ s
)
− Pr
(∑
j 6=i
tj ≥ s
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Probability of a Diamond consumer
= 0
(3)
Lemma 4 decomposes into two parts, the change in profits caused by a small
change in pi around pei . Firstly shoppers for product i search irrespective of their vi,
which therefore continues to be distributed on [a, b] with the usual density f (vi).
Consequently profits on shoppers are simply pi [1− F (pi)] (the same as in a stan-
dard zero-search-cost monopoly problem), and so small changes in pi around pei
affect profits by 1 − F (pei ) − peif (pei ). Secondly Diamond consumers for product
i have vi − pei > 0, so they would all buy product i even if the price were slightly
more than expected. Consequently a small increase in pi above pei , causes profits
on Diamond consumers to increase by 1. Just like consumers at a single-product
retailer, their demand is locally perfectly inelastic. To summarize the multiproduct
problem with positive search cost is really an average of the standard monopoly and
Diamond problems. The next lemma is therefore very intuitive
Lemma 5 In a non-Diamond equilibrium, pei > pm for each unadvertised good i
Although the market no longer collapses, prices are high because the firm faces
a ‘sample selection’ problem. In particular the consumers who search are a select
8We use the term ‘shoppers for product i’ because these consumers act as if they have no search
cost when it comes to buying good i. This terminology mimics the existing literature, in which
somebody is a ‘shopper’ if they have no search cost. See for example Stahl (1989).
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group of people who have several high valuations. Consumers understand that the
firm will exploit this ex post, and therefore equilibrium prices are driven above the
frictionless benchmark pm. Mathematically equation (3) can only be satisfied when
the gains on Diamond consumers (from increasing pi above pei ) are offset by losses
on shoppers. A small increase in pi above pei only leads to losses on shoppers if
1 − F (pei ) − peif (pei ) < 0, which (due to the quasiconcavity of pi [1− F (pi)]) is
equivalent to pei > p
m. Moreover prices exceed pm even when the search cost is
very small, as the next example shows.
Example 6 (Small search cost) As s→ 0, pei → p¯ei where
p¯eif (p¯
e
i )
1− F (p¯ei )
=
1
1−∏j 6=i F (pej) (4)
The lefthand side of equation (4) is the (absolute) elasticity of the demand curve
1− F (pi), evaluated at pi = p¯ei . It increases in p¯ei and equals 1 when p¯ei = pm. The
righthand side is the inverse of the probability that a given consumer is a shopper
for product i. Since the righthand side exceeds 1, the equilibrium price exceeds pm
even though the cost of searching is very small.
2.2 Equilibrium multiplicity and selection
As discussed earlier Diamond equilibria always exist, but nobody searches so the
firm doesn’t make any profit. By contrast proposition 3 says that when n is large
enough, there exist equilibria in which consumers search and the firm does make a
profit. Now if production involves a small fixed cost, the firm will only enter the
market if it expects to play a non-Diamond equilibrium. Therefore using the logic
of forwards induction, when the firm does enter, consumers should expect to play a
non-Diamond equilibrium.
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However there may be multiple non-Diamond equilibria, in which case fur-
ther equilibrium selection is required. Multiple equilibria can arise because if con-
sumers’ price expectations change, the firm is searched by a different mix of people
and therefore its pricing incentives also change. For example if consumers suddenly
expect prices to be lower, they are more likely to search even if they have several
low product valuations. The firm optimally responds by cutting its prices, and in
principle consumers’ expectations could then be correct. The following lemma is
useful since it places some structure on the set of equilibrium price vectors.
Lemma 7 In any equilibrium with trade, all products have the same price
Lemma 7 means that we can henceforth refer to just a single ‘representative’
unadvertised price, and use it to rank different equilibria. Clearly consumers prefer
the equilibrium with the lowest unadvertised price. More surprisingly perhaps, the
next lemma shows that the monopolist does as well.
Lemma 8 The firm prefers equilibria with lower unadvertised prices
Equilibrium prices are so high that relatively few consumers search and make
purchases. Consequently the firm’s profits are actually higher in equilibria with
lower prices. This can be proved using the following revealed preference argu-
ment. Suppose there are two equilibrium prices p′ and p′′ where p′′ < p′. In the p′
equilibrium the firm earns a profit on product i equal to
p′ ×
b∫
p′
f (vi) Pr
(
n∑
j=1
max (vj − p′, 0) ≥ s
)
dvi (5)
When consumers expect the p′′ equilibrium they search if
∑n
j=1 max (vj − p′′, 0) ≥
s, and then buy product i provided that it gives positive surplus. Therefore if the
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firm ‘deviates’ and charges a price p′, its profit on product i is
p′ ×
b∫
p′
f (vi) Pr
(
n∑
j=1
max (vj − p′′, 0) ≥ s
)
dvi (6)
which strictly exceeds (5). However when consumers expect the p′′ equilibrium, the
firm prefers to charge p′′ rather than p′. So by revealed preference, profits in the p′′
equilibrium must exceed (6), and therefore also exceed profits in the p′ equilibrium.
Lemma 8 suggests that the equilibrium with the lowest price may be salient, because
it Pareto dominates any other equilibrium.9 Therefore we assume
Assumption When multiple equilibria exist, agents coordinate on the equilibrium
with the lowest price
2.3 Comparative statics
This section looks at how the equilibrium price - which we call p∗ - is affected
by changes in the search cost and product range. To do this recall that tj ≡
max (vj − p∗, 0) is the (equilibrium) expected surplus on good j. Substituting
pej = p
∗ for j = 1, 2, . . . , n into equation (3) and then rearranging, p∗ satisfies
1− F (p∗)− p∗f (p∗) +
Pr
(∑n
j=1 tj ≥ s
)
− Pr
(∑n−1
j=1 tj ≥ s
)
Pr
(∑n−1
j=1 tj ≥ s
) = 0 (7)
Following on from the previous section we focus on the lowest p∗ which solves
equation (7), and we assume that profit functions are quasiconcave.10 The final
9Fixed costs may also lead to coordination on the lowest equilibrium. To see this let p¯i and pˆi be
profits in the equilibria with the lowest and second-lowest prices. If the firm must pay a fixed cost
between pˆi and p¯i, it only enters the market when it expects to play the lowest equilibrium. So by
forward induction when the firm does enter, consumers should believe they are playing the lowest
equilibrium. Numerical examples show that p¯i− pˆi can be large, so this argument may apply widely.
10The profit function is quasiconcave provided that f (vi) does not decrease too rapidly or that n
is sufficiently large. Further details are provided in footnote 6 and in lemma 19 in the appendix.
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term in equation (7) is the ratio of Diamond consumers to shoppers for a single
product, and it plays an important role in subsequent proofs.
Proposition 9 The equilibrium price is increasing in the search cost
After controlling for product range and production costs, a multiproduct mo-
nopolist charges higher prices when search is more costly. This is a very natural
result, and single-product search models such as Anderson and Renault (1999) also
find a positive relationship between price and search cost. The usual intuition is that
higher search costs deter consumers from looking around for a better deal, which
gives firms more market power. However the mechanism which drives Proposition
9 is different. In our model a multiproduct firm faces a sample selection problem,
which becomes worse when the search cost is larger. When s is small, the surplus
from any single product is less pivotal in determining a consumer’s search decision,
so the ratio of shoppers to Diamond consumers is relatively large. Marginal pricing
incentives can be close to what they would be if there were no search cost, so equi-
librium prices can be relatively low. Now if s suddenly increases, some consumers
with relatively low valuations no longer search, so the firm responds by increasing
its prices. Consumers anticipate this and become even less willing to search - so the
firm attracts an even more select sample of consumers, and (equilibrium) prices are
driven up even further.
Proposition 10 The equilibrium price is decreasing in the number of products
There is lots of casual and empirical evidence that larger stores are cheaper (see
for example Kaufman et al 1997), but this is usually attributed to greater buyer
power and economies of scale. Proposition 10 says that even after controlling for
these factors, larger stores should still be cheaper. The reason is that larger stores
attract a different type of consumer and therefore have different pricing incentives.
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For example compare a ‘small store’ with a hypothetical ‘large store’ (which sells
everything in the small store, plus some additional products). Think about an ex-
periment in which consumers expect every product in both stores to cost the same
amount. The large store attracts some extra consumers, and they tend to have low
valuations on the products sold in the small store. Consequently the large store
has more incentive to cut its prices on those products, compared with the small
store. Consumers anticipate this and correctly believe that larger stores charge
lower prices. Moreover we can show that as n → ∞, (almost) every consumer
searches and the equilibrium price is arbitrarily close to pm.11
Despite charging lower prices, a larger retailer still earns more profit on each
product compared with a smaller retailer. Intuitively this is because the smaller
firm is effectively ‘trapped’ into charging high prices, such that few consumers ever
search it or buy any of its products. The following revealed preference argument
can be used to prove this. If the firm sells n′ products and the equilibrium price is
p′, the profit from any single product is
p′ ×
b∫
p′
f (vi) Pr
(
n′∑
j=1
max (vj − p′, 0) ≥ s
)
dvi (8)
Now suppose instead that the firm sells n′′ products and the equilibrium price is p′′,
where n′′ > n′ and p′′ < p′. If the firm ‘deviates’ and charges p′, it earns
p′ ×
b∫
p′
f (vi) Pr
(
n′′∑
j=1
max (vj − p′′, 0) ≥ s
)
dvi (9)
on each product. This is because consumers expected prices to be p′′ (and therefore
searched on that basis), but having searched will buy any product when they value
it more than its price. Notice that (9) strictly exceeds (8) since n′′ > n′ and p′′ < p′.
11We have assumed that s is independent of n, but in reality there could be a positive relationship
between the two. Proposition 10 should still be robust as long as s does not increase too rapidly.
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Now in fact the firm chooses to charge p′′ rather than p′, so by revealed preference
the per-good profit when n = n′′ must exceed (9), and therefore also exceed the
per-good profit when n = n′.
Proposition 10 could also help explain why firms co-locate near to each other
in shopping malls and highstreets. In particular we could interpret the multiproduct
monopolist as a cluster of n single-product firms, each of which sells a different and
unrelated product. Dudey (1990) and others have already shown that sellers of sim-
ilar or identical products may cluster together. By doing this rival firms commit to
fiercer competition and therefore lower prices. This makes consumers more likely
to search, which increases the demand of every firm in the cluster. However propo-
sition 10 suggests a stronger result - even single-product firms that sell completely
unrelated goods, can also commit to charging lower prices (and earn higher profits)
by clustering together. This is despite the absence of any competition between firms
in the cluster.
3 Advertising
A retailer may sometimes use advertising to inform consumers about some of its
prices. If the monopolist were able to costlessly advertise every price, then it would
choose to do so. It could then commit to whatever prices it wanted to. However
advertising is costly, so firms often advertise at most a small proportion of their
prices. To capture this in a tractable way, we allow the firm to pay a cost ca and
advertise one of its prices. (All results in this section generalize to situations where
several prices can be advertised, provided the search cost is sufficiently small.) To
recap the move order is as follows. The firm first decides whether to advertise and
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then picks an advertised price.12 It then chooses unadvertised prices to maximize
profits, given the set of consumers that it expects will search. We therefore begin
by studying how these unadvertised prices are determined in equilibrium.
3.1 Solving for equilibrium unadvertised prices
Suppose the firm sends out an advert stating that the price of good n is pan. Adverts
must be truthful, so consumers update their expectation of the price of good n to
pen = p
a
n. They also form an expectation about the price of every other unadver-
tised product. Given these price expectations pe = (pe1, p
e
2, .....p
e
n), all the analysis
from section 2.1 can be straightforwardly applied. In particular demand for unad-
vertised product i can still be written as equation (1), and the equilibrium first order
condition for unadvertised good i remains
Di (pi = p
e
i ;p
e)− peif (pei ) Pr
(∑
j 6=i
max
(
vj − pej , 0
) ≥ s) = 0 (2)
It is still the case that each unadvertised price (weakly) exceeds pm - because as
usual the people who search are a select sample of relatively high-valuation con-
sumers, so the firm exploits this by charging high unadvertised prices. We can
also show that in any equilibrium all unadvertised prices are the same (c.f. lemma
7), and that multiple equilibria may exist. However the lowest such equilibrium is
again Pareto dominant (c.f. lemma 8), and we therefore select it for comparative
statics. Since pan enters equation (2) via consumer search decisions, the firm can use
it to manipulate (beliefs about) equilibrium unadvertised prices.
Proposition 11 If pan decreases, so does the equilibrium price of all other products
12For tractability we assume that the advert is received by every consumer. Bester (1994) presents
a single-product search model in which a monopolist can pay to increase the reach of its advert. The
firm employs a mixed strategy, randomizing over both its price and its advertising reach.
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Proposition 11 shows that by advertising the price of just a single product, the
firm is able to credibly transmit some information about all its other (unadvertised)
prices. This is despite the fact that products are completely unrelated in terms of
use, valuation, and production cost. Consequently even rational consumers, who
have no interest in buying the advertised product, should nevertheless account for
its price when deciding whether or not they should search. Our model also gives a
new explanation for why selected low-price advertising might give retailers a store-
wide ‘low-price image’. As discussed earlier, proposition 11 differs from both Lal
and Matutes (1994) and Ellison (2005), because they find that when a firm cuts its
advertised price, it is never able to credibly convince rational consumers that its
unadvertised price is any lower.
The intuition behind proposition 11 is as follows. If a group of consumers
are not searching, then a reduction in pan persuades some of them to do so. These
new consumers must have relatively low valuations, otherwise they would have al-
ready been searching. The firm therefore reduces its unadvertised prices in order to
sell more products to these new (low-valuation) visitors. Whilst consumers do not
naively expect every price to be pan, they do anticipate that a fall in p
a
n is accompa-
nied by a decrease in unadvertised prices. As a comparison with Lal and Matutes
and Ellison, there is one extreme situation in which a reduction in pan does not
strictly reduce unadvertised prices. In particular if pan ≤ a− s, the advertised price
is so low that every consumer expects to earn s or more surplus from it alone. Since
every consumer searches, there is no sample selection effect and the firm charges
pm on each unadvertised product. Even if pan falls, no new consumers search so
unadvertised prices are still pm.
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3.2 Optimal advertised price
When the firm advertises, it chooses pan to maximize total profits across all n prod-
ucts. In order to characterize the optimal pan, first write out the demand for adver-
tised good n as
Dn (p
a
n;p
e) =
b∫
pan
f (vn) Pr
(
n−1∑
j=1
max
(
vj − pej , 0
)
+ vn − pan ≥ s
)
dvn (10)
which is similar to the expression for unadvertised demand in equation (1) with one
crucial difference. Since consumers are able to observe the actual price pan prior
to visiting the store, their decision about whether or not to search is affected by it.
Therefore the advertised product has a more elastic demand curve. Let Πj (pan;p
e)
denote the profit earned on good j when the advertised price is pan and unadvertised
prices are at the corresponding equilibrium level. The firm chooses pan to maximize∑n
j=1 Πj (p
a
n;p
e), which (assuming differentiability) gives the following first order
condition
dΠn (p
a
n;p
e)
dpan
+
n−1∑
j=1
∂Πj (p
a
n;p
e)
∂pan
+
n−1∑
k=1
n−1∑
l=1
∂Πk (p
a
n;p
e)
∂pel
∂pel
∂pan
= 0 (11)
The first term is the total effect of pan on the profits of the advertised good, account-
ing for the change in unadvertised prices. We show in the appendix that this term
is negative for all pan ≥ pm. Intuitively the search cost depresses demand for the
advertised product, so the firm would like to partly offset this by reducing pan below
pm. The second term is the direct effect of pan on the profits of unadvertised goods,
keeping unadvertised prices fixed. It is negative because an increase in pan reduces
the probability a consumer searches, which then reduces the probability that she
buys any unadvertised product. Finally the third term accounts for the indirect ef-
fect of a change in pan on profits earned from unadvertised products, and is also
negative. When pan increases so do unadvertised prices (proposition 11), and this21
is bad for profits because prices are already too high. (This can be proved using a
similar revealed preference argument to those on pages 14 and 17.) To summarize,
the lefthand side of (11) is negative when pan ≥ pm, therefore:
Lemma 12 The optimal advertised price is strictly below pm
According to lemma 12 the firm uses a low advertised price (below pm) to attract
consumers into the store, and then charges a high price (above pm) on its remaining
unadvertised products. In Lal and Matutes and Ellison firms also use a low adver-
tised price to attract consumers into the store, whereupon they are sold over-priced
unadvertised products. This incentive is also present in our model, and is captured
by the first two sets of terms in equation (11). However in our model there is an
additional reason to use low-price advertising - captured by the last set of terms
in equation (11) - namely the desire to build a low-price image. We have already
seen that unadvertised prices are high, and the firm would be better off if they were
lower, because then more people would search and make purchases. Therefore in
order to acquire such a low-price image, the firm exploits the mechanism identified
in proposition 11 and further reduces its advertised price. Indeed as the following
example illustrates, sometimes the firm may find it optimal to reduce the advertised
price even below marginal cost:
Example 13 (Loss-leader pricing) Suppose n = 15, s→ 0 and valuations are in-
dependently distributed on [−1/2, 1/2] with f (v) = 4e−4v/ (e2 − e−2). The firm’s
optimal advertised price is pan ≈ −0.074 - which is less than its (zero) marginal
cost
When deciding whether or not to advertise, the firm compares the gain in profits
against the cost ca. The firm therefore advertises whenever ca is sufficiently small,
and the store-wide implications of this are as follows
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Remark 14 When the firm advertises, it charges strictly lower prices on every
product
When the firm does not advertise, it charges pu (say) on every product, where
pu > pm. Now when it does advertise, the firm could always choose pan = p
u
and then by inspection of equation (2), it would still be an equilibrium for every
other product to be priced at pu. However lemma 12 shows that the optimal adver-
tised price is below pm, and therefore by proposition 11 the remaining unadvertised
prices must also be below pu. Therefore when the firm advertises a good deal on one
product, it also offers cheaper prices on everything else - advertising consequently
leads to store-wide lower prices.13
Finally it would be interesting to know whether there is any relationship be-
tween store size and advertising behavior. For example is a larger store more or less
likely to advertise? How does product range affect the optimal advertised price? It
turns out that equation (11) is not sufficiently tractable to study these questions ana-
lytically, but numerical examples show that the answers are in any case ambiguous.
For instance figure 2 shows an example in which the optimal advertised price at first
decreases in n and then increases rapidly. (In figure 2 valuations are uniformly dis-
tributed on [−1, 1] and s→ 0.) Intuitively an increase in n has two opposing effects
on the optimal advertised price. Firstly a larger store tends to charge lower prices
13As far as we are aware, only Milyo and Waldfogel (1999) have tested empirically whether or
not advertising leads to store-wide lower prices. They note that after the Supreme Court overturned
Rhode Island’s ban on alcohol advertising, a few stores advertised some of their liquor prices. Mi-
lyo and Waldfogel show (Table 5, page 1091) that those stores cut advertised prices by around 20
percent, but did not reduce their other unadvertised prices by a statistically significant amount. How-
ever prior to the Court ruling some retailers were advertising prices of non-alcoholic items such as
peanuts and potato chips; the Court ruling may have caused them to switch to advertising liquor
products instead. The effect on most unadvertised prices would then be ambiguous.
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Figure 2: Non-monotonicity of the optimal advertised price
anyway, so has less need to use a low advertised price to create a low-price image.
But secondly when there are more (unadvertised) products, the benefits of having a
low-price image are larger. Figure 2 suggests that the latter effect dominates when
n is small, and the former dominates otherwise.
4 Extensions
4.1 Downward-sloping demands
The Diamond Paradox is often presented with downward-sloping demands. It is
well-known that if consumers have an identical downward-sloping demand curve
and the search cost is not too large, there is an equilibrium in which the firm charges
the standard monopoly price and everybody searches. We now show that our ear-
lier results can be generalized to the case where consumers have heterogeneous
downward-sloping demands.
Start with the simplest case where n = 1. Suppose that each consumer’s de-
mand can be written as p1 = θ + P (q1) where q1 is the quantity consumed and
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P (q1) is continuously differentiable, strictly decreasing and concave. θ is a random
variable which is distributed on
[
θ, θ
]
according to a strictly positive density func-
tion g (θ); consumers are heterogeneous and each receive an independent draw from
this distribution. An important feature of this set-up is that consumers with higher
θ have both a larger and a less elastic demand; the former implies that consumer
surplus increases in θ, and this plays an important role. If there is no search cost
and types are not too different, the firm sells to everybody and charges the standard
monopoly price pm which is defined as
pm = argmax
x
∫ θ
θ
g (θ)
{
xP−1 (x− θ)} dθ (12)
If instead the search cost is positive and the firm doesn’t advertise, there exist two
critical thresholds s and s which satisfy 0 < s < s. Firstly and unlike with unit
demands, a small search cost need not affect the equilibrium price14
Lemma 15 When s ≤ s there exists an equilibrium in which the price is pm
The explanation behind lemma 15 is simple: since the search cost is small (and
expecting to pay a price pm) every consumer finds it worthwhile to search. The
firm then faces the same problem as it does when s = 0, and consequently charges
pm. Secondly however when s ∈ (s, s) the equilibrium described in lemma 15 no
longer exists. If consumers expected to pay pm, those with a low θ would not expect
to earn enough surplus to cover the search cost and therefore would not search. The
firm would only attract high-θ consumers (who have relatively inelastic demands)
and would therefore optimally charge more than pm. However unlike in example 2
the market does not completely unravel, and instead
14As usual there are also equilibria in which consumers expect a very high price and nobody visits
the store. As in section 2.2 we rule out such equilibria.
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Lemma 16 When s ∈ (s, s) there exists an equilibrium in which the price strictly
exceeds pm but some consumers do search and buy the product
There is a parallel between lemma 16 and lemma 5. In both cases the firm is
searched by a select sample of high-type consumers, and this pushes the equilibrium
price above the frictionless benchmark pm. Thirdly and finally, we can also prove
that when s ≥ s¯ the search cost is too high to support an equilibrium with trade.
We now move to the general case where n ≥ 1 and some prices may be adver-
tised. Each consumer again receives an independent draw from the θ distribution,
and her demand for product j can be written as pj = θ + P (qj) where qj is the
quantity consumed of good j.15 We can again find two thresholds s′ and s′ which
satisfy 0 < s′ < s′. Analogous to lemma 15 if s ≤ s′ there exists an equilib-
rium in which each unadvertised good is priced at pm. Analogous to lemma 16
if s ∈ (s′, s′) there is an equilibrium in which some consumers search and each
unadvertised price strictly exceeds pm. Moreover:
Proposition 17 Suppose that s ∈ (s′, s′). The (Pareto dominant) equilibrium un-
advertised price is increasing in s, decreasing in n, and increasing in any advertised
price
There is a parallel between proposition 17 and earlier results in the unit demand
model. Intuitively if n increases, some new consumers with a relatively low θ de-
cide to search. These new consumers have relatively elastic demands, so the firm
optimally reduces its unadvertised prices. Consumers anticipate this and again cor-
rectly believe that a larger store charges lower prices. Similarly a fall in the search
cost or a decrease in advertised prices also encourage low-θ consumers to visit the
15We could add more heterogeneity and write demand as pj = θj + P (qj) with the θj differing
across consumers and products. However setting θj = θ is enough to make the main point.
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store, and therefore also reduce equilibrium unadvertised prices. Consequently as
in the unit demand model, the firm can again use a low advertised price on one
product to build a low-price image.
4.2 Competition
While a full analysis of competition is beyond the scope of the current paper, we
show how our results on advertising can be applied to a duopoly. We suppose
that two firms A and B sell the same two products. Consumers search the firms
sequentially with perfect recall, and search randomly when indifferent. Each re-
tailer can pay a cost ca and advertise the price that it charges for product 2.16 The
move-order is otherwise similar to section 1. In the first stage firms simultaneously
choose whether or not to advertise, and pick prices for the two products. In the sec-
ond stage consumers observe advertised prices, form price expectations, and decide
which firm (if any) to search first. In the final stage consumers learn unadvertised
price(s) at the firm that they searched, and then decide whether to search the other
firm as well, before finally making purchase decisions.
It is convenient to introduce the following notation. If the market were con-
trolled by a non-advertising monopolist, it would charge pu < b on both products
and earn profit piu > 0. If instead the monopolist advertised a price pa2, it would
charge φ (pa2) on unadvertised product 1 and earn total profit pi (p
a
2) − ca. (Where
φ (pa2) is the unique p
e
1 which solves equation (2) for the case n = 2 and p
e
2 = p
a
2.)
We assume that pi (pa2) is continuous and quasiconcave in p
a
2, and reaches its maxi-
mum value of pia when pa2 = p
∗ (< pu). Returning to the duopoly case we have the
16We do not consider the case where firms advertise different products. In practice competing
retailers often advertise similar or even identical products, because certain products are more salient
and important to consumers than others. We could incorporate this by allowing v1 and v2 to have
different distributions, and the equilibrium in proposition 18 would not be qualitatively different.
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following proposition.
Proposition 18 If ca < pia − piu/2 there is a symmetric equilibrium in which
(a) Each firm advertises with probability pi
a−piu/2−ca
pia−piu/2 . When a firm advertises, the
distribution of its advertised price is given by the c.d.f
G (pa2) =
pi (pa2) [pi
a − piu/2]− capia
pi (pa2) [pi
a − piu/2− ca]
defined on the interval
[
p, p∗
]
where p = pi−1
(
capia
pia−piu/2
)
.
(b) A non-advertising firm charges pu for both products.
A firm that advertises a price pa2 on product 2, charges φ (p
a
2) for product 1
(c) Consumers expect a non-advertising firm to charge pu for both products, and an
advertising firm to charge φ (pa2) on product 1
The first part of proposition 18 shows that provided the advertising cost ca is
not too large, duopolists randomize between not advertising, or posting an adver-
tised price which is drawn from an atomless distribution G (pa2). The second part
shows that given its advertising decision (either no advert, or a particular advertised
price pa2) a duopolist charges the same unadvertised price(s) as would a monopo-
list. Consequently prices are always strictly higher at a firm that does not advertise.
Moreover the lower a firm’s advertised price, the lower also is its unadvertised
price. Therefore if a consumer searches, she should first visit the firm with the low-
est advertised price (and choose randomly if nobody advertises).17 In equilibrium
consumers have correct price expectations, and therefore never search twice.
The reason why firms randomize over their advertising decision (part (a)) is sim-
ilar to Baye and Morgan’s (2001) paper on internet gatekeepers, and is as follows.
17In particular φ (pa2) is strictly increasing in p
a
2 when p
a
2 ≥ a − s, and φ (pa2) = pm when
pa2 ≤ a − s. Therefore any consumer who searches, must expect to earn strictly higher surplus by
searching the firm with the lowest advertised price.
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If a firm doesn’t advertise, it is only searched (and makes a sale) when its competi-
tor also doesn’t advertise. By posting an advert the firm becomes more likely to
make a sale but also has to incur the cost ca. In equilibrium the cost and benefit of
posting an advert are identical, so the firm is indifferent about whether to advertise.
Moreover when it does advertise, the firm randomizes over its choice of pa2 in order
to prevent its competitor from undercutting it and stealing the entire market.
The explanation behind the pricing strategies in part (b) of the proposition is also
straightforward. First consider a non-advertising firm. The firm is only searched if
its competitor is also not advertising, in which case both are expected to charge
pu. In terms of (v1, v2) space, each firm is then searched by the same mix of con-
sumers as a monopolist. Therefore each firm maximizes its profits by charging pu
as expected. Secondly if a firm posts an advertised price pa2, it is always searched
unless its rival has advertised a lower price. Conditional upon being searched the
firm again attracts the same mix of consumers as a monopolist - and therefore also
maximizes its profits by charging a price φ (pa2) on product 1.
Combining parts (a) and (b) of proposition 18, prices are random but positively
correlated. A firm’s advertised price still conveys information about its unadvertised
price, so consumers should always check the adverts before deciding which firm (if
any) they should search.
5 Conclusion
Consumers are often poorly-informed about prices and have to spend time and ef-
fort searching for them. This paper presents a simple model that analyzes how
these search costs affect the pricing behavior of a multiproduct retailer. We first
demonstrate that although multiproduct firms can overcome the Diamond Paradox,
unadvertised prices still exceed what a monopolist would charge in the frictionless
29
benchmark. Intuitively consumers only search if they have relatively high valua-
tions, and the firm exploits this by charging high prices. We then show that a retailer
with a broader product selection is searched by consumers who, on average, have
a lower valuation for any single product. A larger store therefore has less incentive
to hold-up consumers and so, in equilibrium, charges lower prices but earns more
profit on each individual product.
Firms sometimes use adverts to directly inform consumers about a small propor-
tion of their prices. We show that when consumers observe a low advertised price
on one product, they rationally anticipate that all other (unadvertised) prices will
be somewhat lower as well. Therefore by advertising a low price on one product, a
firm can build a store-wide low-price image and significantly increase the number
of consumers who search it.
One aspect that our model does not explicitly address is bundling. It is well-
known that in theory a firm can sometimes increase its profits by bundling, but few
retailers choose to do this in practice. It turns out that in our model, the ability to use
bundling causes a two-product retailer to earn zero profits. With pure bundling the
firm (effectively) sells only one product, so Diamond’s no-trade result applies. One
can also show that mixed bundling similarly causes the market to collapse. This
suggests that when consumers have search costs, retailers may (where possible)
commit to not use bundling.
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A Appendix
Proof of lemma 1. Differentiate piDi (pi;pe) with respect to pi to get
Di (pi;p
e)− pif (pi) Pr (T + max (pi − pei , 0) ≥ s) (13)
where T =
∑
j 6=i max
(
vj − pej , 0
)
. Substitute pi = pei and set (13) to zero.
Lemma 19 A necessary condition for piDi (pi;pe) to be quasiconcave in pi is that
p [1− F (p)] is concave in p∀p ∈ [a, pei ). Sufficient conditions are i). p [1− F (p)]
is concave in p∀p ∈ [a, b] or ii). Pr (T ≥ s) ≥ 1/2.
Proof of lemma 19. Necessity When pi < pei the derivative of (13) with re-
spect to pi is proportional to −2f (pi)− pif ′ (pi) which is the second derivative of33
pi [1− F (pi)]. We can show that if p [1− F (p)] is not concave for all p < pei , then
there exists a p˜ < pei such that p [1− F (p)] is convex ∀p ∈ (p˜, pei ).18 But then
piDi (pi;p
e) is also convex ∀pi ∈ (p˜, pei ) and therefore not quasiconcave.
Sufficiency If pi ≥ pei +s then piDi (pi;pe) = pi [1− F (pi)], which is decreas-
ing in pi because pei ≥ pm (lemma 5) and pi [1− F (pi)] is quasiconcave. So we
must check that piDi (pi;pe) strictly increases in pi when pi ∈ [a, pei ), and strictly
decreases in pi when pi ∈ (pei , pei + s). To do this, rewrite (13) as
[Di (pi;p
e)− pif (pi) Pr (T ≥ s)]
+ pif (pi) [Pr (T ≥ s)− Pr (T + max (pi − pei , 0) ≥ s)]
The second term is 0 when pi ≤ pei , and negative otherwise. The first term is by
definition 0 when pi = pei . Therefore it is sufficient to show that the first term is
strictly positive when pi ∈ [a, pei ) and strictly negative when pi ∈ (pei , pei + s). i). if
p [1− F (p)] is concave, the first term strictly decreases in pi and so has the required
signs. ii). if we divide the first term by f (pi), it also strictly decreases in pi and so
has the correct signs, provided Pr (T ≥ s) > 1/2.19 Finally we can also verify that
if Pr (T ≥ s) > 1/2, then pei lies on the concave part of p [1− F (p)].
Proof of proposition 3. Let p˜ be the unique solution to 1−F (p)− pf (p) /2 = 0,
and n˜ be the smallest n such that Pr
(∑n
j=2 max (vj − p˜, 0) ≥ s
)
> 1/2. It is
sufficient to look for a symmetric equilibrium in which pej = p
e∀j (although lemma
18Note that −2f (p)− pf ′ (p) is proportional to −2/p− f ′ (p) /f (p) which increases in p since
f (p) is logconcave. So if there exists p˜ such that−2f (p˜)− p˜f ′ (p˜) = 0 then p [1− F (p)] is convex
∀p > p˜. (It is also simple to prove that always p˜ > pm.)
19In more detail, the derivative is −Pr (T + max (pi − pei , 0) ≥ s) − Pr (T ≥ s) −
Di (pi;p
e) f ′ (pi) /f (pi)
2. This is negative if Pr (T ≥ s) ≥ 1/2 because −f ′ (pi) /f (pi)2 ≤
1/ [1− F (pi)] (due to logconcavity of 1− F (pi)) and because Di (pi;pe) ≤ 1− F (pi).
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7 later shows this is also necessary). Using equation (2) pe satisfies
Di (pi = p
e;pe)− pef (pe) Pr
(∑
j 6=i
max (vj − pe, 0) ≥ s
)
= 0 (14)
The lefthand side of (14) is strictly positive when evaluated at pe = pm, because
Di (pi = p
e;pe) ≥ [1− F (pe)] Pr
(∑
j 6=i max (vj − pe, 0) ≥ s
)
and 1−F (pm)−
pmf (pm) = 0. Assuming n ≥ n˜, the lefthand side of (14) is strictly negative
when evaluated at pe = p˜, because Di (pi = pe;pe) ≤ 1− F (pe) and 1− F (p˜)−
p˜f (p˜) /2 = 0. Therefore since the lefthand side is continuous in pe, there exists
(at least one) pe ∈ (pm, p˜) which solves (14). According to lemma 19 profit is
quasiconcave because Pr
(∑n
j=2 max (vj − pe, 0) ≥ s
)
> 1/2.
Proof of lemma 4. Add and subtract Pr
(∑
j 6=i tj ≥ s
)
[1− F (pei )] from equation
(2). Then note that Pr
(∑n
j=1 max
(
vj − pej , 0
) ≥ s) can be rewritten as
b∫
pei
f (vi) Pr
(
n∑
j=1
max
(
vj − pej , 0
) ≥ s) dvi+F (pei ) Pr
(∑
j 6=i
max
(
vj − pej , 0
) ≥ s)
Proof of lemma 7. Suppose not - then without loss of generality suppose pe1 < pe2
instead. Lemma 19 says that p [1− F (p)] must be concave for all p < pe2, so
1 − F (pe2) − pe2f (pe2) is less than 1 − F (pe1) − pe1f (pe1), which is itself negative
since lemma 5 says that pe1 > p
m. Also Pr
(∑
j 6=2 tj ≥ s
)
> Pr
(∑
j 6=1 tj ≥ s
)
,
so if equation (3) holds for i = 1, it cannot hold for i = 2 - a contradiction.
Proof of propositions 9 and 10. Equation (7) is copied here for convenience
φ (p∗; s, n) = 1− F (p∗)− p∗f (p∗) +
Pr
(∑n
j=1 tj ≥ s
)
Pr
(∑n−1
j=1 tj ≥ s
) − 1 = 0
where tj ≡ max (vj − p∗, 0). Firstly fix n and decrease s from s0 to s1 < s0.
Let p∗s0 denote the lowest solution to φ (p
∗; s0, n) = 0. Lemma 20 (below) shows35
that φ (p∗; s, n) increases in s, so we conclude that φ
(
p∗s0 ; s1, n
) ≤ 0. Since
φ (pm; s1, n) > 0 and φ (p∗; s1, n) is continuous in p∗, this implies that when s = s1
the lowest equilibrium price is (weakly) below p∗s0 . So the lowest equilibrium price
increases in s. Secondly fix s and increase n from n0 to n1. Let p∗n0 be the lowest
solution to φ (p∗; s, n0). Lemma 21 (below) shows that φ (p∗; s, n) decreases in n,
so we conclude that φ
(
p∗n0 ; s, n1
) ≤ 0. This again implies that when n = n1, the
lowest equilibrium price is (weakly) below p∗n0 , so the lowest equilibrium price falls
in n.
Lemma 20 φ (p∗; s, n) increases in s
Proof of lemma 20. Define v˜j = vj−p∗, and note that v˜j has a logconcave density
function f˜ (v˜j) defined on the interval
[
a˜, b˜
]
where a˜ = a − p∗ and b˜ = b − p∗.
Recall that the v˜j are iid and that tj ≡ max (v˜j, 0).
Define Ω (s, n) = Pr
(∑n
j=1 tj ≥ s
)/
Pr
(∑n
j=2 tj ≥ s
)
. φ (p∗; s, n) increases
in s if and only if Ω (s, n) increases in s. We now prove that Ω (s, n) increases in s.
Begin with n = 2 Consider Pr (t1 + t2 ≥ x) for some x > 0. If v˜1 ≥ x then
t1 + t2 ≥ x since t2 ≥ 0; if v˜1 ∈ (0, x) then t1 + t2 ≥ x if and only if t2 = v˜2 ≥
x− v˜1; if v˜1 ≤ 0 then t1 + t2 ≥ x if and only if t2 = v˜2 ≥ x. Therefore
Pr (t1 + t2 ≥ x)
Pr (t2 ≥ x) =
Pr (v˜1 ≤ 0) Pr (v˜2 ≥ x) +
∫ x
0
f˜ (z) Pr (v˜2 ≥ x− z) dz + Pr (v˜1 ≥ x)
Pr (v˜2 ≥ x) (15)
= Pr (v˜1 ≤ 0) +
∫ x
0
f˜ (z)
Pr (v˜2 ≥ x− z)
Pr (v˜2 ≥ x) dz + 1
which increases in x. This is because v˜2 is logconcave and so has an increasing
hazard rate, which means that Pr (v˜2 ≥ x− z) /Pr (v˜2 ≥ x) increases in x.
Now proceed by induction We show that if Ω (w, n− 1) increases in w, then
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Ω (s, n) increases in s. To prove this, let k > 1 and write:
Ω (s, n)−k =
Pr
(∑n
j=1 tj ≥ s
)
Pr
(∑n
j=2 tj ≥ s
)−k = Pr
(∑n
j=1 tj ≥ s
)
− k Pr
(∑n
j=2 tj ≥ s
)
Pr
(∑n
j=2 tj ≥ s
)
(16)
Then using the same principles used to derive equation (15), expand only the top of
equation (16) to get
Ω (s, n)− k = Pr (v˜n ≤ 0)
Pr
(∑n−1
j=1 tj ≥ s
)
− k Pr
(∑n−1
j=2 tj ≥ s
)
Pr
(∑n
j=2 tj ≥ s
)

+
∫ s
0
f˜ (z)
[
Pr
(∑n−1
j=1 tj ≥ s− z
)
− k Pr
(∑n−1
j=2 tj ≥ s− z
)]
dz +
∫ b˜
s
f˜ (z) [1− k] dz
Pr
(∑n
j=2 tj ≥ s
)
(17)
Since t1 and tn are iid, the first term in (17) simplifies to Pr (v˜n ≤ 0) [1− k/Ω (s, n− 1)],
which is weakly increasing in s because of the inductive assumption that Ω (w, n− 1)
increases in w. The second term in (17) is proportional to∫ s
0
f˜ (z)
[
Pr
(
n−1∑
j=1
tj ≥ s− z
)
− k Pr
(
n−1∑
j=2
tj ≥ s− z
)]
dz+
∫ b˜
s
f˜ (z) [1− k] dz
Using the change of variables y = s− z, this can be rewritten as∫ 0
s−b˜
f˜ (s− y) [1− k] dy+
∫ s
0
f˜ (s− y)
[
Pr
(
n−1∑
j=1
tj ≥ y
)
− k Pr
(
n−1∑
j=2
tj ≥ y
)]
dy
and then written more compactly as∫ ∞
−∞
10≤s−y≤b˜f˜ (s− y) Γ (y) dy (18)
where 10≤s−y≤b˜ is an indicator function taking value 1 when 0 ≤ s− y ≤ b˜, and 0
otherwise; and where
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Γ (y) =
 1− k if y ≤ 0Pr(∑n−1j=1 tj ≥ y)− k Pr(∑n−1j=2 tj ≥ y) if y > 0
Now let S be an interval in R++ such that Pr
(∑n−1
j=1 tj ≥ s
)
> 0∀s ∈ S, and
choose s0, s1 ∈ S where s1 > s0. Also choose a constant k0 such that (18) is zero
when evaluated at s = s0 and k = k0. (Zero terms being discarded) Γ (y) has one
sign-change from negative to positive: this follows directly from the definition of
k0 (> 1) and the inductive assumption that Ω (w, n− 1) increases in w.
Using the definition in Karlin (1968) §1.1, 10≤s−y≤b˜ is totally positive of order 2
(TP2) in (s, y). Since f˜ (z) is logconcave, f˜ (s− y) is also TP2 in (s, y). Therefore
10≤s−y≤b˜f˜ (s− y) is also TP2 in (s, y).
Applying Karlin’s Variation Diminishing Property (Karlin §1.3, Theorem 3.1),
(18) changes sign once in s (and from negative to positive) when it is evaluated at
k = k0. Since by assumption (18) is zero when evaluated at s = s0 and k = k0, it
is positive when evaluated at s = s1 and k = k0. Therefore returning to equation
(17) it follows that Ω (s1, n) − k0 ≥ Ω (s0, n) − k0, or equivalently that Ω (s, n)
increases in s. In summary we have shown that if Ω (w, n− 1) increases in w, then
Ω (s, n) increases in s. Since Ω (w, n) increases in w for n = 2, Ω (s, n) increases
in s for any integer-valued n.
Lemma 21 φ (p∗; s, n) decreases in n
Proof of lemma 21. φ (p∗; s, n) decreases in n if and only if Ω (s, n) decreases in
n. To show that Ω (s, n) decreases in n, write out Ω (s, n) as
Pr (v˜n ≥ s) +
∫ s
0
f˜ (v˜n) Pr
(∑n−1
j=1 tj ≥ s− v˜n
)
dv˜n + Pr (v˜n ≤ 0) Pr
(∑n−1
j=1 tj ≥ s
)
Pr (v˜n ≥ s) +
∫ s
0
f˜ (v˜n) Pr
(∑n−1
j=2 tj ≥ s− v˜n
)
dv˜n + Pr (v˜n ≤ 0) Pr
(∑n−1
j=2 tj ≥ s
)
This is less than Ω (s, n− 1) because Pr
(∑n−1
j=1 tj ≥ x
)/
Pr
(∑n−1
j=2 tj ≥ x
)
ex-
ceeds 1 and (from lemma 20) is increasing in x. Therefore we know that Ω (s, n) ≤
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Ω (s, n− 1) for any n, or alternatively Ω (s, n) decreases in n.
Proof of proposition 11. Let p′ be the equilibrium unadvertised price. Let tj =
max (vj − p′, 0) for j < n, and tn = max (vn − pan, 0). Then using equation (7)
again, p′ satisfies
Φ (p′; pan) = 1− F (p′)− p′f (p′) +
Pr
(∑n−1
j=1 tj + tn ≥ s
)
Pr
(∑n−1
j=2 tj + tn ≥ s
) − 1 = 0
We focus on the smallest p′ which solves Φ (p′; pan) = 0, and assume that the condi-
tions for quasiconcavity in lemma 19 are satisfied. Note that Φ (p′; pan) is continuous
in p′, and that Φ (pm; pan) ≥ 0. Therefore if Pr
(∑n
j=1 tj ≥ s
)/
Pr
(∑n−1
j=2 tj ≥ s
)
increases in pan, the lowest p
′ (that solves Φ (p′; pan) = 0) also increases in p
a
n. To
prove that ω (pan) = Pr
(∑n
j=1 tj ≥ s
)/
Pr
(∑n−1
j=2 tj ≥ s
)
increases in pan, write:
ω (pan)− k =
Pr
(∑n
j=1 tj ≥ s
)
− k Pr
(∑n
j=2 tj ≥ s
)
Pr
(∑n
j=2 tj ≥ s
) (19)
Just as in the proof of lemma 20, the numerator of (19) can be rewritten as∫ pan
a
f (vn)
[
Pr
(
n−1∑
j=1
tj ≥ s
)
− k Pr
(
n−1∑
j=2
tj ≥ s
)]
dvn
+
∫ pan+s
pan
f (vn)
[
Pr
(
n−1∑
j=1
tj ≥ s+ pan − vn
)
− k Pr
(
n−1∑
j=2
tj ≥ s+ pan − vn
)]
dvn
+
∫ b
pan+s
f (vn) [1− k] dvn (20)
Using the change of variables y = pan − z (20) can be written as∫ ∞
−∞
1a≤pan−y≤bf (p
a
n − y) γ (y) dy (21)
where γ (y) =

1− k if y ≤ −s
Pr
(∑n−1
j=1 tj ≥ s+ y
)
− k Pr
(∑n−1
j=2 tj ≥ s+ y
)
if y ∈ (−s, 0)
Pr
(∑n−1
j=1 tj ≥ s
)
− k Pr
(∑n−1
j=2 tj ≥ s
)
if y ≥ 0
39
and 1a≤pan−y≤b is again an indicator function that is TP2 in (p
a
n, y). Now choose
pa,0n , p
a,1
n ∈ [a− s, b] such that pa,0n < pa,1n . Also define k0 such that (21) is zero
when evaluated at pan = p
a,0
n and k = k0. (Zero terms being discarded) γ (y) is
piecewise continuous and changes sign once from negative to positive: this follows
from the definition of k0 (> 1), and because Pr
(∑n−1
j=1 tj ≥ x
)/
Pr
(∑n−1
j=2 tj ≥ x
)
increases in x (from lemma 20). Karlin’s variation diminishing property says that
(21) is single-crossing from negative to positive in pan. Therefore ω (p
a,1
n ) − k0 ≥
ω (pa,0n )− k0, or equivalently ω (pan) increases in pan as required.
Proof of lemma 12. Note that lemma 12 does not depend on differentiability. Most
of the proof was sketched in the text, so we just show that dΠn (pan;p
e) /dpan < 0
when pan ≥ pm. Firstly when pan increases, so do unadvertised prices - less people
search so demand (and profit) for good n falls. Secondly keeping unadvertised
prices fixed, ∂Πn (pan;p
e) /∂pan < 0 too. To show this, write T =
∑n−1
j=1 tj: note
that T ≥ 0, that in general Pr (T = 0) > 0, and that T is atomless on (0,∞). Let
µ (T ) be the density of T for T ∈ (0,∞). Then Πn (pan;pe) can be expressed as
Pr (T = 0) pan [1− F (pan + s)] +
∫ s
0
µ (z) pan [1− F (pan + s− z)] dz
+
∫ ∞
s
µ (z) pan [1− F (pan)] dz (22)
To interpret (22) note that somebody with T ∈ [0, s) only searches if vn−pan ≥ s−T
- and after searching buys good n since they have vn > pan. Also somebody with
T ≥ s searches irrespective of their vn, and then buys good n if vn ≥ pan. Since
f (v) is logconcave so is 1−F (v), therefore p [1− F (p+ y)] is quasiconcave in p.
Using steps on page 111 of Anderson and Renault (2006), p [1− F (p+ y)] is also
maximized at a price below pm. It then follows that p [1− F (p+ y)] is decreasing
in p for all p > pm. Therefore using (22), ∂Πn (pan;p
e) /∂pan whenever p
a
n ≥ pm.
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B Omitted proofs
B.1 Proofs for Section 4.1 (first extension)
Define Q (z) ≡ P−1 (z) and note that since P ′, P ′′ < 0, then Q′, Q′′ < 0 as well.
Also define Π (p; θ) = pQ (p− θ), define p∗ (θ) = arg maxx xQ (x− θ), and let
CS (pj; θ) be the consumer surplus of a θ-type on one product when its price is pj .
A preliminary result is:
Remark 22 p∗ (θ) and CS (p∗ (θ) ; θ) are both strictly increasing in θ
Proof. Differentiate pQ (p− θ) with respect to p to get a first order condition
Q (p− θ) + pQ′ (p− θ) = 0. Then totally differentiate with respect to θ to get
∂p∗ (θ)
∂θ
=
Q′ (p∗ (θ)− θ) + p∗ (θ)Q′′ (p∗ (θ)− θ)
2Q′ (p∗ (θ)− θ) + p∗ (θ)Q′′ (p∗ (θ)− θ) ∈ (0, 1)
Since ∂p∗ (θ)/ ∂θ ∈ (0, 1) and (by definition) p∗ (θ) = θ + P (q∗ (θ)), it follows
that ∂P (q∗ (θ))/ ∂θ < 0 or equivalently ∂q∗ (θ)/ ∂θ > 0 (because P ′ < 0). We
can also write
CS (p∗ (θ) ; θ) =
∫ q∗(θ)
0
[pj − p∗ (θ)] dqj =
∫ q∗(θ)
0
[P (qj)− P (q∗ (θ))] dqj
which is strictly increasing in θ because P ′ < 0 and ∂q∗ (θ)/ ∂θ > 0.
For simplicity assume that all prices are unadvertised. It is clear that each un-
advertised price must be the same - so let p be the actual price and pe the expected
price. We will prove lemmas 15 and 16 for a general n ≥ 1. All consumers with
θ ≥ θ˜ will search, where θ˜ is the minimum θ ∈ [θ, θ] such that n×CS (pe; θ) ≥ s.
So profit on good j is
∫ θ
θ˜
g (θ) {pQ (p− θ)} dθ - differentiating this with respect to
p and imposing p = pe, we find that pe satisfies20∫ θ
θ˜
g (θ) Π′ (pe; θ) dθ =
∫ θ
θ˜
g (θ) {Q (pe − θ) + peQ′ (pe − θ)} dθ = 0 (23)
20Since Q′, Q′′ < 0 profit is quasiconcave in p provided that types are not too different.
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It is useful to note that ∂Π′ (pe; θ) /∂θ > 0, therefore using equation (23) Π′
(
pe; θ˜
)
<
0. This then further implies that Π′ (pe; θ) < 0∀θ ≤ θ˜. In particular Π′ (pe; θ) < 0
so since Π (p, θ) is concave in p, we then know that pe > p∗ (θ).
Remark 23 In any equilibrium with trade, pe ≥ pm
Proof. Suppose not and that actually pe < pm. Then since θ˜ ≥ θ and (from above)
Π′ (pe; θ) < 0∀θ ≤ θ˜, we know that ∫ θ
θ˜
g (θ) Π′ (pe; θ) dθ ≥ ∫ θ
θ
g (θ) Π′ (pe; θ) dθ.
Also
∫ θ
θ
g (θ) Π (p; θ) dθ is concave and maximized at p = pm, therefore since by
assumption pe < pm, we know that
∫ θ
θ
g (θ) Π′ (pe; θ) dθ > 0. Connecting these two
inequalities, we conclude that
∫ θ
θ˜
g (θ) Π′ (pe; θ) dθ > 0 which contradicts equation
(23) and therefore rules out pe < pm as an equilibrium.
Now define s′ = n×CS (pm; θ) and s′ = n×CS (p∗ (θ) ; θ). We need to check
that s′ > s′. Using remark 22 we know that CS
(
p∗
(
θ
)
; θ
)
> CS (p∗ (θ) ; θ).
Also by definition
∫ θ
θ
g (θ) Π′ (pm; θ) dθ = 0, so since ∂Π′ (p; θ) /∂θ > 0, this
implies that Π′ (pm; θ) < 0. Since Π (p; θ) is concave, this further implies that
pm > p∗ (θ). Therefore CS (p∗ (θ) ; θ) > CS (pm; θ). Putting these results together
gives CS
(
p∗
(
θ
)
; θ
)
> CS (pm; θ) as required.
Proof of lemmas 15 and 16. Again define s′ = n × CS (pm; θ) and s′ =
n × CS (p∗ (θ) ; θ). Lemma 15 then follows immediately. Now prove Lemma
16. Firstly s > s′ so we know that θ˜ > θ. Then using the proof of remark 23,
the lefthand side of equation (23) is strictly positive when evaluated at pe = pm.
Secondly consider pe = p∗
(
θ
)
. s < s′ so consumers with θ = θ and (by continu-
ity) types with θ ≈ θ¯ also search. Therefore θ˜ < θ. Also ∂Π′ (p; θ) /∂θ > 0 and
(by definition) Π′
(
p∗
(
θ
)
; θ¯
)
= 0, therefore Π′
(
p∗
(
θ
)
; θ
)
< 0 for all θ < θ.
Hence the lefthand side of equation (23) is strictly negative when evaluated at
pe = p∗
(
θ
)
. Thirdly since the lefthand side of (23) is continuous in pe, strictly
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positive when pe = pm and strictly negative when pe = p∗
(
θ
)
, there exists at least
one pe ∈ (pm, p∗ (θ)) such that (23) holds.
Proof of proposition 17. We only prove this for an increase in n on the assumption
that all prices are unadvertised. If there are multiple equilibria, the one with the
lowest pe is again Pareto dominant (the proof is the same as with unit demand). Let
pe0 be the lowest equilibrium price when n = n0, and θ˜0,0 be the lowest type that
searches when n = n0 and price pe0 is expected. Now suppose that when n = n1
but price pe0 is still expected, the lowest type that searches is θ˜0,1.
Suppose that n1 > n0, in which case θ˜0,1 < θ˜0,0. Adapting earlier arguments we
know that a). θ˜0,0 > θ and b). Π′ (pe0; θ) < 0 for all θ < θ˜0,0. Therefore the lefthand
side of (23) when evaluated at pe = pe0 but n = n1 is∫ θ
θ˜0,1
g (θ) Π′ (pe0; θ) dθ <
∫ θ
θ˜0,0
g (θ) Π′ (pe0; θ) dθ = 0
i.e. strictly negative. At the same time (23) is still weakly positive when evaluated
at pe = pm and n = n1. Therefore (by continuity) the lowest solution to (23) when
n = n1, must be strictly lower than the lowest solution when n = n0.
The proof for comparative statics in s is very similar, as is the proof of compar-
ative statics in any advertised price (except that the thresholds s′ and s′ are defined
slightly differently to reflect the fact that not all prices are unadvertised).
B.2 Proof for section 4.2 (second extension)
Consider part (a). A non-advertising firm only sells when its competitor also doesn’t
advertise - and then splits the market equally and earns piu/2. So profit from not
advertising is:
piu
2
ca
pia − piu/2 (24)
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Advertising a price p∗, earns−ca if the competitor advertises and pia−ca otherwise,
or in total
pia
ca
pia − piu/2 − ca =
piu
2
ca
pia − piu/2 (25)
Advertising some pa2 ∈
[
p, p∗
]
gives profit −ca if the competitor advertises a lower
price, and pia − ca otherwise. In total this amounts to[
1− pi
a − piu/2− ca
pia − piu/2 G (p
a
2)
]
pi (pa2)− ca =
piu
2
ca
pia − piu/2 (26)
Since (24), (25) and (26) are equal the firm is indifferent between not advertising
or advertising any price in
[
p, p∗
]
. Now check that a firm cannot benefit by posting
some other advertised price. If a firm advertises pa2 < p, it earns less profit than if
it advertised pa2 = p, because pi (p
a
2) is increasing in this region and in both cases
the firm captures the entire market. If a firm advertises pa2 ∈ (p∗, pu], it does better
by advertising pa2 = p
∗ instead - it is searched (weakly) more often, and profit per
customer pi (pa2) decreases in this region. Finally advertising p
a
2 > p
u yields zero
profit since the firm is never searched. The argument behind part (b) was already
sketched in the text21, whilst consumers’ beliefs in part (c) are consistent on the
equilibrium path.
21One small point which we omitted in the text is the following. Suppose a firm has advertised
pa2 and this is the lowest price. If consumers expected a price φ (p
a
2) but the duopolist’s actual price
exceeded φ (pa2) + s, some people might search (and eventually buy from) the competitor. Hence a
duopolist has even less incentive than a monopolist does, to deviate from charging φ (pa2).44
